In this paper, we introduce a completely new and unique historical dataset of Belgian stock returns during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. This high-quality database comprises stock price and company related information on more than 1500 companies. Given the extensive use of CRSP return data and the data mining risks involved it provides an interesting out-of-sample dataset with which to test the robustness of 'prevailing' asset pricing anomalies. We re-examine mean reversals in long-horizon returns using the framework of Hodrick (1992) and Jegadeesh (1991). Our simulation experiments demonstrate that it has considerably better small sample properties than the traditional regression framework of Fama and French (1988a). In the short run, returns exhibit strong persistence, which is partially induced by infrequent trading. Contrary to Fama and French (1988a) and Poterba and Summers (1988), our results suggest that, in the long run, there is little to no evidence of stock prices containing autoregressive stationary components but instead resemble a random walk. Capital appreciation returns exhibit stronger time-varying behavior than total returns. Belgian stock returns demonstrate significant seasonality in January notwithstanding the absence of taxes. In addition, in contrast to other months, January months do show some evidence of mean reversion.
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Introduction
In his 1970 survey of early empirical studies on the statistical properties of financial asset returns, Fama could still conclude that "the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and (…) contradictory evidence is sparse." (Fama (1970), p. 416) . Shiller (1981) , Shiller and Perron (1985) and Summers (1986) challenge this assertion, claiming that if stock prices exhibit slowly mean reverting behavior, earlier tests lack statistical power in rejecting the market efficiency hypothesis. In their 'fads' model prices can deviate considerably from fundamental values but gradually revert towards their 'full-information' values as time passes because investors become aware of overly optimistic or pessimistic market reaction to past information and slowly revise valuation. A first-order autoregressive price process is therefore a reasonable representation of this sort of mean reverting behavior. However, when the implied autocorrelation is high, prices resemble a random walk and successive short-horizon price changes will demonstrate little correlation since it may take several years before the stock price completely adjusts to account for erroneous 'fad' shocks. Using this insight, Fama and French (1988a) and Poterba and Summers (1988) report highly significant negative serial dependence in long-horizon U.S. stock returns claiming that predictable variation due to mean reversion or slowly decaying price components accounts for 30% to 40% of total return variances.
1 In addition, a whole plethora of variables that are linked to the business cycle have been found to have predictive power for stock returns. 2 This gives credence to the claim that long-horizon mean 2 reversion is not so much due to irrational behaviour, but to time-varying expected returns. Assuming that expected dividends are not affected (Campbell (1991) ), shocks to expected stock returns produce a contemporaneous opposite adjustment to the current stock price. Consistent with the long up and down movements of business conditions, expected risk premiums may be highly persistent but mean reverting.
Regardless of whether mean reversion is due to irrational behaviour or rationally varying expected returns, the empirical evidence seems to be taken for granted based on the recent interest in dynamic asset allocation strategies based on the predictability of asset returns (e.g. Campbell and Viceira (2001) ; Cochrane (1999) ).
Nevertheless, testing return predictability raises important methodological issues with regard to the estimation procedure and the data mining problem. Examining the highly volatile return generating process of stocks requires the availability of long time series of high quality to produce tests with reasonable power. The CRSP files provide one such database. Its ready availability has encouraged researchers to devote considerable effort to understanding the return generating process behind its data.
Unfortunately, this violates the implicit assumption of classical statistical inference that every hypothesis should be tested with one particular dataset and an a priori choice of the explanatory variables. Instead, the low-cost availability of the CRSP data and the lack of other reliable and independent data sources have led to an explosion of empirical research with thousands of researchers examining the same return data. In a persevering attempt to test hypotheses, however, there is a high probability of detecting spurious relationships without theoretical justification and 1995), Hodrick (1992) , Nelson and Kim (1993) and Torous, Valkanov and Yan (2001) ); the earnings-to-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller (1988b) and Campbell and Yogo (2003) ); changes in the short-term interest rate (Ang and Bekaert (2005) , Campbell (1987 Campbell ( , 1991 , Campbell and Yogo (2003) , Hodrick (1992) and Torous et al. (2001) ); the aggregate consumption-to-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) ); other macroeconomic indicators (Balvers, Cosimano and McDonald (1990) , Fama (1990) , Nelson and Kim (1993) ). The literature is vast and we offer only some representative references. We apologize to the authors of the papers that have not been listed.
3 erroneously identifying instruments with predictive power. The substantial danger of data mining and its implications for the reliability of statistical analysis this practice induces are problems well recognised but hardly considered in empirical research (Denton (1985) , Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003) , Foster, Smith and Whaley (1997) , Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Merton (1987) ). The consequence of data mining is that inferences based on conventional significance levels are inappropriate, leading to over-rejection of the null hypothesis of no predictability. Stylised facts found to describe the dynamic behavior of stock returns can be artefacts of the sample being used (Ferson et al. (2003) ). To circumvent these difficulties, researchers can either adjust the critical values of the test statistics or employ a new and independent dataset to test the stylised facts of asset pricing theory.
In this study, we follow the latter approach by studying mean reversion of stock returns using a completely new and unique dataset of historical stock returns from the Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE). To the best of our knowledge, this is probably the most comprehensive and accurately constructed historical index representing more 1500 different common stocks during the period 1832-1914. Moreover, the BSE ranked among the most developed markets during this period. We believe that this independent return database provides a useful and valuable out-of-sample test for different asset pricing anomalies identified in the literature, and, importantly, is not subject to the data mining critique. In addition to the data mining issue, the recent empirical literature questions the reliability of evidence in favor of predictable longhorizon variation in returns. It is argued that the test statistics used have low power and rely unduly on asymptotic results. Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) are very similar to those of the total return indices. In addition, we provide insight on the size of the BSE. Figure 1 graphs the evolution of the BSE equal-, price-and valueweighted total return indices. We have return data over a period of 83 years or 996 monthly stock price observations. During those years, the number of (purely) Belgian 6 We are most grateful to William Goetzmann (and the International Center of Finance) for providing these data. 7 We construct five size portfolios by classifying companies according to their equity market capitalization as recorded at the end of December of the previous year. The stocks composing each size portfolio are equal-weighted to obtain a total and capital appreciation return for every size portfolio. 'Size I' to 'Size V' comprise the smallest to largest market cap firms respectively. 8 companies listed on the BSE averaged 145 and reached a maximum of 396 near the end. 8 The average total market capitalization of the BSE amounted to more than 1.1 billion BEF (28 million euros). Total market capitalization was 27% of GNP in 1846, steadily growing to 80% in 1913 80% in (Annaert et al. (2004 ). Noticeable is the large difference in market capitalizations between the different size portfolios. The smallest firms ('Size I') have a market cap that is only one fiftieth of the largest ones ('Size V') and represent, on average, less than 2% of the total market capitalization of all firms compared to more than 67% for the largest companies.
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The historical return properties across indices and size portfolios for the BSE are generally similar to the patterns we see nowadays. The total return index has an average monthly return of 0.35% (4% yearly) when value-weighted and 0.44% (more than 5% yearly) when equal-weighted. These numbers are substantially lower than the average return for U.S. stocks during the twentieth century, but somewhat higher than the average returns in the GIP dataset. The higher return for the equal-weighted index arises from the high return of the smallest size portfolio 'Size I' (0.68% monthly or more than 8% yearly) that is almost double that of the largest size portfolio 'Size V' (0.35% monthly or more than 4% yearly). As expected, standard deviations exhibit a similar tendency. Smaller firms are considerably more volatile than large caps (4.95%
for 'Size I' versus 2.49% for 'Size V' on a monthly basis). Returns on most indices and all size portfolios are marginally to very positively skewed and highly leptokurtic implying a 'fat tailed' distribution.
8 Annaert et al. (2004) classified all companies listed on the BSE based on geographical location of the major production facilities and country of residence of the company. For this study, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of purely Belgian companies with the most important production facilities located in Belgium. Three other categories were constructed, but correlation coefficients with the purely Belgian index are close to one. 9 Notice that this distribution is quite similar to that in the U.S. CRSP series; see e.g Fama and French (1993) However, a lack of trading might even bear on the larger stocks as they were often issued at prices considerably higher than the average daily wage during most of the century. This made stock trading an activity that was only available to the wealthiest and stock splits as well as delistings (from mergers or bankruptcy) and other capital operations could lead to substantial underestimation of the average return earned by investors. The weighing scheme is another potential factor in affecting performance.
The BSE indices show that for Belgian stocks price is not a good proxy for the relative market capitalization of stocks. Table 1 also shows that U.S. returns are considerably more volatile than Belgian returns (4.06% compared to 2.37% for the value-weighted index). Part of it may be due to the smaller number of stocks in the U.S. index that are moreover less spread across industries. In addition, as lack of information on particular corporate capital operations like stock splits and large dividend payouts erroneously lead to highly negative returns for stocks (manifested in the very low minimum returns for the historical U.S. indices), these data flaws possibly influence risk measurement. The first-order autocorrelation is substantially lower and even negative. Apparently, the construction of the U.S. indices is less 11 subject to the problem of infrequent trading than the BSE indices and portfolios.
Indeed, GIP only compute returns when they have two adjacent price observations, which eliminates the effect of stale prices.
Testing Long-Horizon Mean Reversion
Preliminary results and caveats
The null hypothesis of stock prices following a random walk imposes a simple restriction on the covariance structure of returns, that is ( )
where t r is the continuously compounded return. It is a set of orthogonality conditions on the population autocovariances of stock returns, which determines any test statistics used for testing the mean reversion of the underlying return generating process. Recent studies have applied an assortment of alternative but strongly related test statistics to investigate the high and low frequency univariate properties of returns. The common feature is that they all concentrate on the aggregation of single period returns for better capturing the alleged mean reverting pattern induced by the slowly decaying transitory price component. The basic intuition is unambiguous.
When the persistence factor of prices is close to one, single period price changes appear to correspond to a pure random walk. However, compounding returns implies that price movements due to the stationary component add up while random fluctuations average out. Therefore, serial correlations measured over a short time span may be negative causing prices to mean revert in the long run, but are individually too small to reveal significance while analyzing long-horizon autocorrelations through return aggregation might prove economically and statistically significant. This paper estimates serial correlations of stock returns directly using regressionbased techniques. 11 Fama and French (1988a) and McQueen (1992) examine multiperiod autocorrelations by regressing k-period returns on lagged k-period returns:
where the slope coefficient k β is the first-order autocorrelation of the k-period stock return. Since there is ex ante little theoretical justification for the exact number 'k' of single period returns to compound, a series of regressions for increasing holding periods of 1 to 10 years is often run.
In Panel A of Table 2 we present similar regression results for the value-weighted return index of the BSE over the period 1832-1914. Monthly logarithmic returns are summed to obtain overlapping monthly observations on long-horizon returns for ten different k-period measurement intervals (k = 12, 24, …, 120). We first correct the slope coefficients for the well-known negative small sample bias in autocorrelation estimates owing to errors made in estimating the unknown true mean from the sample (Kendall (1954) and Marriott and Pope (1954) ). Assuming that the true value of the i th -order sample autocorrelation is zero, its expected value in small samples of length T equals ( )
− . This is relevant for regression (2), as Richardson and Smith (1994) show that the slope coefficients k β are approximated by a linear combination of the sample autocorrelation coefficients i ρ . More specifically,
13 Using this expression for the bias of the sample autocorrelation coefficients, we compute the bias on k β and subtract it from the regression estimates. following the long-horizon regression approach of (2) has some econometric drawbacks. Although the standard errors of the coefficients take into account the serial correlation of the residuals, induced by using overlapping observations, it is not clear to what extent these corrections are adequate in the samples that we consider. In addition, the k-period long-horizon return is a rolling sum of the original series t r .
Valkanov (2003) demonstrates that in a rolling summation of series that are integrated of order zero, the long-horizon variable resembles asymptotically a series integrated of order one. Such persistent stochastic behavior in both the dependent and independent variable might produce the well-known spurious correlation problem (Ferson et al. (2003) ) and potentially erroneous identification of return predictability.
All three caveats affect our results. First, to show the impact of the slow convergence to the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics, we simulate the small sample distributions in a Monte Carlo simulation with 25,000 runs. In each run, we first generate T normally distributed return observations, where T is the number of observations for the respective stock return series and where we assure that the simulated series have the same standard deviation as the original ones. 13 For each random series we perform the same regressions as for the original series to obtain the small sample distributions for the t-statistics at each horizon. 14 Of course, we apply the appropriate small sample bias-correction on the slope coefficients. Significance is determined based on the simulated empirical p-values. 13 In addition, to account for heteroskedasticity, we run a second set of simulations where we introduce GARCH effects. However, the results are generally similar so we restrict ourselves to reporting the results for the case of constant conditional return variances. 14 Although we could rely on the simulated distribution of the estimated slope coefficient, we prefer to evaluate significance using the simulated distribution of the t-test because the latter is asymptotically a pivotal statistic. That is, its asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown population parameters.
From the lower part of 
As the Wald test does not take into account the sign of the coefficients, we follow Jegadeesh's (1991) and Richardson and Stock's (1989) suggestion and also test whether the average autocorrelation coefficient in (2) To deal with the third caveat, Hodrick (1992) demonstrates that the potential problem of getting spurious significant results due to summing both regressand and regressor can be circumvented by eliminating the overlapping nature of the dependent variable.
Moreover, Daniel (2001) and Jegadeesh (1991) demonstrate that, in terms of power, the most optimal test for analysing the mean reverting behavior of stock returns is a regression of the single period return t r on the lagged k-period return:
We will refer to this regression as the 'modified' long-horizon regression. It may thus be the case that the failure to reject the random walk hypothesis for many series in Table 2 is due to a lack of power. In the remainder of the paper, we will focus the discussion on the results for the modified regression given its superior statistical
properties.
Before we turn to the results regarding the modified regression, we should draw the attention to a feature of our data that is not consistent with most published results. It is remarkable that we find large significant positive serial correlation for the 12-month returns. 16 Its 0.19 is significant at the 5% level. The EW and PW indices in Panel B of Table 2 exhibit the highest point estimates of over 0.25, which are highly significant. This is related to the higher order serial correlations in monthly returns that remain positive after one lag, in particular for the smaller firms (Table 1) . Positive autocorrelation in one-year returns seems to imply that the AR(1) return specification 18 postulated by Summers (1986) is inappropriate for shorter horizons. Of course, stale information on stock prices inducing the infrequent trading effect of positive serial correlation could account for the short-horizon persistence in Table 2 . Two facts are consistent with this interpretation. First, the degree of positive serial correlation at a 12-month measurement interval is lower for the VW index and the larger size portfolios. Second, the slope coefficient for the GIP data, where stale prices are less of a concern, is very close to zero. 17 To attenuate the impact of stale prices, we will present results based on quarterly and annual data as a robustness check in section 4. 
Modified Long-Horizon Regressions
As expected from the analytical specifications (3) and (6), the downward bias in the slope coefficients of the modified long-horizon regressions is considerably smaller and equal to -0.001 for all horizons. The Monte Carlo simulations for specification (5) unequivocally establish the better small sample properties of the modified longhorizon regressions. Standard errors for the slopes are much lower than in Table 2 and even decrease for larger measurement intervals. Moreover, although not really converging, the simulated t-distributions of (5) have a considerably smaller left tail than those of (2) and are less negatively skewed at long-horizons. At the short end of 19 the return horizon intervals, the distribution is nearly symmetric and approximates the conventional (normal) significance levels.
From (6), the slopes of the modified regressions can be interpreted as the average serial correlation coefficient over the return horizon k. It is therefore not surprising that the short-horizon estimates of (5) Though the modified long-horizon regressions have greater power against interesting alternative hypotheses, the evidence of mean reverting patterns in equity returns identified in the previous section, especially for the EW index and small stocks, largely vanishes. The estimated coefficients for both total and capital appreciation 21 returns of all indices (except for the PW index) and size portfolios are negative for horizons between 5 and 8 years; however, they are negligibly small and, more importantly, not significant. The differences between total return and price appreciation returns are less pronounced, but present as in the previous section there is slightly more evidence for mean reversion in the latter series.
Evaluating the joint time series properties of the different horizon estimates for the modified long-horizon specification of (5), we find a highly significant Wald statistic for all indices and size portfolios. Of course, this is arguably to a large extent due to the positive 12-month slope. The fact that the average test is positive (although mostly insignificant) is consistent with this explanation.
In general, we conclude that there is at best some weak evidence for slowly decaying transitory components in stock prices of the BSE during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The slope coefficients for all series do exhibit a Ushaped pattern, but the point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Given the positive coefficients at the shorter horizons and the often negative, but small and insignificant coefficients at the longer horizons, the results are more consistent with some form of mean aversion that is eventually 'corrected'.
Alternatively, market microstructure effects may be responsible for the observed patterns, an issue we will further investigate in section 4. Neither is there strong evidence in favour of mean reversion in U.S. stock returns based on the GIP data. If a slope coefficient is significant it is at the not very restrictive (one-sided) 10% level.
The joint Wald test is also significant at this level, but the average slope coefficient is virtually zero.
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Robustness Analysis
Quarterly and annual results
Results in section 2 and 3 show that BSE stock returns exhibit large (first-order) serial correlations. Infrequent trading effects may induce this short-term momentum and if so, does not reveal any fundamental economic story about expected returns or investor behavior. Infrequent trading is arguably less of a concern when returns are sampled at lower frequencies. To verify the robustness of our results we therefore rerun our modified long-horizon regressions and simulations across different horizons with quarterly and annual return data. Table 4 reports the bias-adjusted slope coefficients of the modified regressions estimated using non-overlapping quarterly returns (Panel A) and annual returns (Panel B). We use the same forecasting horizons as in the monthly analysis. In general, the quarterly and annual results are very consistent with the monthly results of section 3.
Significantly positive slope coefficients are still found for the shorter horizons.
However, estimates grow less than proportional with the frequency. Looking at the quarterly (annual) results of a one-year forecasting horizon (i.e. k = 4 resp. k = 1), Table 3 and 4 show that the quarterly (annual) estimates are somewhat higher than double (six fold) the monthly estimate. Hence, persistence weakens beyond the first month. Nevertheless, these results support our earlier assertion that, apart from market microstructure effects, other more fundamental or behavioural factors may have induced short-term momentum in BSE stock returns.
Conversely, for longer horizons, most quarterly and annual slope coefficients are negative. However, they remain small and generally insignificant. Quarterly estimates for the VW index and the largest size portfolios are all close to zero. The total return series of the former has a minimum value of -0.023, which is only marginally 23 significant. Although annual slope estimates are higher, for the most part, they stay insignificant. The smaller size portfolios and the EW index have larger coefficient estimates, especially for the annual return series. At horizons of 5 and 6 years, we find significantly negative slopes in the order of -0.17. Other forecasting horizons do not exhibit any significant estimates.
Compared to the analysis with monthly data, Table 4 shows that the estimated Wald statistics are substantially lower for slope coefficients estimated with quarterly or annual returns. Estimates are still jointly significant for the EW index and the smaller size portfolios at a quarterly frequency, which is still likely to be driven by the shorthorizon persistence. The largely insignificant average slope test corroborates this assertion. More importantly, the Wald and AVG statistics of the largest size portfolios and the VW index are only marginally significant at a quarterly frequency and not significant at an annual frequency. In sum, there does not seem to be much evidence for mean reversion even when the returns are sampled at lower frequencies.
Seasonality in mean reversion
Prior research on stock return predictability has identified several puzzling asset pricing anomalies. Probably one of the most documented seasonal regularities is the "January or turn-of-the-year effect." Many time series and cross-sectional studies (e.g. Fama and French (1993) , Keim (1983) , Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and Schwert (2002)) have found significantly higher returns in January compared to other months. Keim (1983) and Schwert (2002) demonstrate that the January seasonality can be attributed to a size premium, i.e. small firms earn significant abnormal returns during the first month of the year relative to larger firms. Tax-loss selling, window-dressing by institutional investors and market microstructure effects are the most commonly proposed explanations for this return anomaly. The institutional framework during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century contained none of these factors other than the microstructure effects. This creates an interesting testing ground for the various hypotheses regarding the January effect. If present in the BSE data, it was certainly not generated by any of the above listed factors.
Previous analysis of total versus capital appreciation returns clearly confirms the importance of dividends for evaluating the overall performance of BSE stock indices and size portfolios during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Table 1 showed that capital appreciation only marginally contributes to total returns.
In addition, dividends paid out by BSE listed companies during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century exhibit clear seasonal patterns. This may affect the properties of monthly as well as long-horizon returns if not appropriately accounted for.
The average dividend yield amounts to 0.3% monthly or 3.5% yearly (see Table 1 ).
However, Table 5 presents monthly return statistics for all months of the year and shows that it conceals large cross-sectional differences in dividend yields across months of the year. Two months are noticeable in particular, that is January and July.
During those months, the VW index realizes a total return of 1.12% respectively 0.86% on a monthly basis. The EW index slightly underperforms the VW index with an average monthly total return of 0.97% respectively 0.69%. 18 All these monthly averages are significantly different from zero at the 0.01%-level. These high return months reflect the dividend payout policies of BSE quoted companies. Throughout January and July, 21% respectively 16% of all listed companies paid out a dividend whereas in the other months this percentage is only 5% (Annaert et al., 2004) . These 25 seasonal patterns in dividend payments characterize the marked differences in stock returns across months. The monthly dividend income in January and July approximates 0.7% and 0.5% respectively for the EW and VW indices as well as the largest size portfolios. The F-test shows that returns in these months are significantly different from returns in the other months of the year, especially for the VW index and the largest size portfolios. The F-statistic is significant at the 1% (January) and 5% (July) level for the VW index. As expected from previous research (Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983)), the smallest size portfolio is the best performing one with the highest average return of more than 1.3% during January, but this return is not especially high compared to the other months. In contrast to the large caps (Size V),
we therefore do not find any significant January effect for the small caps (Size I) (this result is confirmed for the other small cap portfolios, Size II and III). This evidence seems to contest the size premium hypothesis for the January anomaly.
Many researchers have suggested the January effect is a tax effect. They argue that stock prices experience concentrated tax-loss selling at the end of the year and rebound in January providing investors a higher market return at the beginning of the year. Especially smaller firms are supposed to be liable to such investor behavior given their highly volatile nature and the potential of substantial capital losses.
Though the tax hypothesis could be a plausible explanation nowadays, it is questionable that it accounts for the January-effect identified in BSE stock returns during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. First, we did not find any official sources or records making reference to the Belgian government levying taxes on capital gains or dividends during that period. Second, our results show that larger rather than smaller companies achieve abnormal returns throughout the month of January disputing the tax-motivated size premium. Last, abnormal returns earned during January appear to be related to more fundamental factors like dividends rather than taxes as the month of July, another high-dividend-yield month, is subject to the same effect. Further research on dividends and how asset prices respond to dividend information is required to examine these effects in more detail.
Obviously, these results imply that BSE stock returns contain a January (and July) component. So, in compliance with Jegadeesh (1991) we examine whether the alleged time-varying behavior in stock returns is also characterized by a seasonal pattern.
More specifically, we test whether BSE stock prices have larger slowly decaying stationary components in January compared to other months of the year. We perform the same analysis for the month of July.
The modified long-horizon regression (5) allows testing whether the slowly decaying stationary price components are primarily concentrated in January. To that end, we run the regressions separately within and outside January. Specifically, to test the January seasonal we only consider the monthly returns in January as the dependent variable, while the independent variable is, as usual, obtained by aggregating the lagged returns in all months of the chosen aggregation period. Table 6 shows the results for the indices and the size portfolios. In contrast, the results for the non-January months do not correspond to stock prices with transitory components and show that if mean reversion is present, it is entirely concentrated in January. Estimates of slope coefficients for the non-January months are negative, yet close to zero and insignificant for horizons beyond 3 years. The strong persistence for the 12-and 24-month returns documented earlier when all months were included in the regressions, can be attributed to the non-January months.
Especially the EW index and the smallest size portfolios ('Size I and II') display high persistence during months outside January with slope estimates near or above 0.04 28 and significant at the 0.01%-level for the aggregation interval of 12 months.
Coefficient estimates for 24 months remain significant, but are considerably smaller in magnitude. In the previous section, we already emphasized that these strongly decreasing coefficients suggest short-term mean reversion. Strong positive serial correlation in the short run is not confined to smaller companies. The joint tests strongly reject the random walk null hypothesis for all size portfolios. It appears that the lack of mean reversion found in the previous section when we considered all months jointly, is due to strongly significant persistent behavior of returns in the nonJanuary months.
Remarkably, for the U.S. the GIP data show the same pattern, although less obvious and not significant. Slope estimates are generally lower in the January months, again suggesting that if some mean reversion is present, it is concentrated in January, confirming the results that Jegadeesh (1991) found for the 20 th century.
Since Table 5 indicates a similar return effect in the month of July, we perform the same analysis for the July returns. However, the results (not shown) do not correspond to those for January. Regression estimates are close to zero and individually insignificant. As expected, results for the non-July months are very similar to those for the non-January months indicating strong persistent behavior outside of July.
Conclusions
This study examines the time-varying behavior of stock prices using a completely new and unique historical database of Belgian stock returns from the Brussels Stock
Exchange. The dataset covers the period 1832-1914 or 83 years of highly reliable monthly stock price observations and other company related information representing 29 more than 1500 different common stocks. Given the excessive use of the CRSP return data in asset pricing theory and the data mining risks involved this database provides a useful out-of-sample dataset with which to test the robustness of several asset pricing anomalies.
In order to identify whether stock prices contain slowly decaying stationary price components, we use the procedure developed by Hodrick (1992) and Jegadeesh (1991) . As shown in our simulation experiments, this framework has considerably better small sample properties than the regression framework of Fama and French (1988a) . In the short run, stock returns demonstrate high persistence partially reflecting infrequent trading effects that induce strong positive serial correlation.
Contrary to Fama and French (1988a) and Poterba and Summers (1988) , our results indicate that, in the long run, stock prices do not contain large autoregressive temporary components, as stock returns show little to no evidence of mean reverting patterns. Joint analysis of the estimated coefficients shows that long-horizon stock returns resemble random walk behavior. However, BSE stock returns exhibit some form of short-term mean aversion that is eventually 'adjusted' after a few years. We also find that excluding dividend income from returns exaggerates the evidence for mean reversion. This indicates that with the 19 th century data, when dividend income constituted a large part of total returns, care must be taken to include accurate dividend information when constructing data sets. Most interestingly, we find a strong January seasonality in BSE returns although we are unaware of the Belgian government levying taxes on capital appreciation or dividends. The long-horizon mean reversion patterns are completely concentrated in January, a pattern that is consistent with results for the U.S. and the U.K. as presented in Jegadeesh (1991). We leave it to further research to investigate whether this remarkable pattern is related to GIP (1815 GIP ( -1925 Autocorrelation at lag Number of Firms Market Value (mio €)
Brussels Stock Exchange (1832 Exchange ( -1914 This table presents average continuously compounded monthly rates of return in percentages, both for total return and capital appreciation return indices. VW stands for value-weighted, EW for equal-weighted, and PW for price weighted. The size portfolios are equally weighted quintile portfolios for which all stocks were ranked on their market capitalization at the end of the previous year. Portfolios are rebalanced annually. Size I (Size V) contains the 20% smallest (largest) stocks. The significance of the F-test testing whether the average returns of the month indicated differs from the return in the other months is indicated with asterisks. Three asterisks denote significance at the 1% level, two at the 5% level and one at the 10% level. compounded monthly rates of return. In Panel A (B) presents the bias-adjusted slope coefficient for January (non-January) months and indicate the significance level based on the simulated distribution of the tstatistics. Three asterisks denote significance at the (one-sided) 1% level, two at the 5% level and one at the 10% level. VW stands for value-weighted, and EW for equal-weighted. The size portfolios are equally weighted quintile portfolios for which all stocks were ranked on their market capitalization at the end of the previous year. Portfolios are rebalanced annually. All BSE series are total return series. All results are based on 25000 simulation runs. The t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. The WALD column contains the test result for joint significance of all slopes, whereas the AVG column reports the average slope coefficient. Significance is also based on the respective simulated distributions. 
